Southwest Railroad locomotive derailed Nov. 30, 2013 (Photo courtesy of New Mexico State Police)
By Roger Lanse
At approximately 12:30 p.m. on Saturday, Nov. 30, 2013, a Southwestern Railroad Co. locomotive and six of the eight loaded hopper cars the locomotive was pulling derailed between the Highway 152 railroad crossing and Bayard. The locomotive engineer, conductor, and an unauthorized civilian, all riding in the cab, were killed, according to a 2014 Federal Railroad Administration Accident Report (HQ-2013-27).
The deceased, according to local news stories at the time, were Donald White, 38, of Silver City; and Steven Corse, 60, and Ann Thompson, 50, both of Paulden, Ariz.
According to the FRA report, the cause of the derailment was excessive speed due to the crew performing an improper air brake inspection. The report describes the chain of events leading up to the derailment, which are summarized as follows:
€œThe crew went on duty at 7 a.m., Nov. 30, 2013, at Hurley, and departed Hurley en route to the Cobre Mine on a single locomotive. The crew stopped at Bayard, where an unauthorized civilian boarded the locomotive.
The crew and the unauthorized civilian coupled the locomotive to eight hopper cars loaded with magnetite at the Cobre Mine. The locomotive and hopper cars measured 433 feet in length and weighed 1,148 tons. The train crew did not perform a train inspection before departing Cobre Mine €™s loading dock.
The train departed from the Cobre Mine down an estimated two to four percent grade apparently without the crew knowing there was no air flow from the locomotive to the brakes of the eight hopper cars. The train begins to increase speed.
As the train continued to accelerate, the engineer initiated emergency procedures, which may have actually made the problem worse.
An eyewitness observed the train was going too fast and crossed Highway 152 even before the gates went down. The witness stated that smoke was coming from the wheels. He turned his vehicle around to follow the train, as he was sure there was going to be a wreck. When he saw either smoke or a dust cloud ahead he called 911.
As the train entered a fairly sharp right-hand curve, about 1.2 miles after crossing Highway 152, the locomotive uncoupled from the lead hopper car, appears to have gone airborne, and slid down an embankment, ripping out two mature juniper trees before coming to rest at the bottom of the arroyo on its left side. Estimated speed at the time of derailment was 45 miles per hour. The maximum speed authorized is 10 miles per hour.
The eight loaded hopper cars continued for approximately 375 feet, until the first six cars derailed with the last two remaining upright on the rails. €
According to the report, inspection of the locomotive and hopper cars after the derailment indicates that the eight trailing hopper cars had no air brakes from their departure from Cobre Mine until the derailment. This suggests that no air brake test was performed on the cars prior to their departure from the mine. This also implies that there was no rail car inspection prior to their departure from Cobre Mine.
An FRA cover memo to the report states, €œThe FRA contends that the crew of Train RSWC91-30 failed to perform an inspection of their train prior to departing the mine in conjunction with the required Transfer Airbrake Test. During this inspection the crew should have detected that the angle cock of the first head car was closed and the train brake airline was not functional in the eight cars coupled to the locomotive. Although speed of the train played a part in the derailment, speed was the result of the failure to perform a proper train inspection in conjunction with a Transfer Airbrake Test. €
The report states that another factor contributing to the accident was the acceptance by Southwest Railroad €™s management of a safety culture that, in effect, fostered an environment for non-compliance with respect to even the most fundamental elements of a railroad operation, specifically:
1. The failure of Southwest Railroad €™s Operational Testing Program to provide operating rules compliance oversight of its operating employees, and
2. The failure of Southwest Railroad €™s senior management to provide its operating, track, and mechanical employees with proper training in the performance of their duties.
The report stated that the FRA has documented 123 violations from before and after this accident, which indicates a trend of non-compliance and an unsafe environment.
Remedial action by Southwest Railroad has been initiated, according to FRA €™s report.
The report concludes that drug, alcohol, or other type of impairment, or fatigue, were not factors in the derailment.
There were no citations issued by a public authority for failure to comply with state or local statutes, the report said.
Damage to the locomotive, hopper cars, and track system were estimated at $375,000.